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REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS  
 
Introductory ideas about the current problems 
 
It  has  become  increasingly  clear  particularly  in  this  century  that  through  the 
destructive  impacts  of  financial  markets,  economic  crises  are  often  amplified  to 
proportions which set the entire system at risk. V. Cerra and S.C. Saxena
1 have  
shown that failures in real economy brought about by instability and failures in the 
financial sector have an extremely destructive impact, particularly in the developed 
industrial  countries.  Therefore  the  effectiveness  of  the  economic  systems  of  the 
Western  world has been regarded increasingly questionable in public discussions 
and  implementation  of  comprehensive  reforms  is  demanded,  particularly  in  the 
banking sector. Intervention with social and economic policies becomes necessary. 
The issue of who has the decisive say in the economy and in the society as a whole 
is often raised – democratically legitimised representatives of the general public or 
the  managers  sitting  in  the  boards  and  councils  of  banks  who  seek  profits  in 
financial  markets  with  extremely  speculative  self-interested  transactions? 
Comprehensive  regulation  of  financial  markets  has  become  absolutely  necessary 
more than ever since the first signs of the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007, in 
order to prevent conflicts between self-interests of banks and the common good.  
 
The essence of the demands that have stood out in discussions has been to separate 
speculative investment banking (above all trading on own account
2 and lending to 
hedge funds) clearly from classical lending and depositing activities in the so-called 
universal banks, i.e. banks with a wide range of business activities (ring-fencing). 
That way it would be possible to stop setting at risk client-based business activities 
in banks which are faced with bankruptcy due to their risky investment transactions. 
According to the current experience, such banks are eventually rescued (bailed out) 
with state funds because of their importance for the economy
3. Taxpayers eventually 
bear the burden
4. The state becomes a victim of extortion. The function of banks as 
service  providers  to  real  economy  should  be  restored  in  order  to  avoid  such  a 
situation in the future. This assumes the creation of a system which would keep 




 from the U.S.A. is the most radical of these proposals. According 
to the proposal, banks should not be allowed at all to participate in hedge funds and 
                                                                  
1 Cerra, V ./Saxena, S. C., Growth Dynamics: The Myth of Economic Recovery, IMF Working 
Paper, 07.08.2005. 
2 „Casino within a bank“ like the German Handelsblatt calls trading on own account on its 
front page on 30 January 2013 as it may not take into account the interests of responsible 
clients.  
3 These banks are referred to as being „essential for the system“ („too big to fail“). 
4 German social democrats refer to it as „capitalism dominated by financial markets“. 
5 It has been named after Paul Volcker, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System in 1979–1987, currently a senator.    25
private equity funds, to own or finance them, or to trade on their own account
6 at 
their own risk
7. The Liikanen Report
8, on the other hand, is favoured more in the 
European Union. It is dreaded that due to the strict conditions of the Volcker rule the 
prohibited  transactions  may  be  performed  in  the  form  of  „shadow  banking“. 
Therefore the Liikanen Group recommends to major banks
9 to keep their traditional 
transactions  of  private  and  business  clients  separate  from  their  risky  operations 
performed at their own risk in financial markets
10,11. Holding companies created 
according to the OECD model are meant here, with subsidiaries which are legally 
and financially independent organisations with their own banking licenses and each 
responsible for one business area. An investment bank which becomes insolvent due 
to  its  risky  transactions  could  be  liquidated  independently  of  its  client-based 
business area. Credit and deposit transactions and therefore also the funds of bank 
clients  would  be  protected.  Because  only  such  original  banking  transactions  are 
related to real economy. Such keeping apart would make it possible to connect the 
risk  closely  with  liability  related  to  only  profit-oriented  activities  in  separate 
business units.  
 
It is quite understandable that such conceptions on keeping activities separate were 
not  approved  by  the  banking  communities.  Counterarguments  are  not  very 
convincing,  however.  Expenses  related  to  organisational  structure  should  not 
increase much as the main part of the basic business expenses – such as electronic 
data processing – can be used by all subsidiaries also in the future. However, the 
business units that would be engaged in investment banking would not be able to 
rely on the ratings of the customer service units and that would surely increase their 
                                                                  
6 Trading in securities, currencies, precious metals and different kinds of derivatives on own 
account.  
7 According to this, the activities of banks should be limited to orders received from clients, 
and  banks  themselves  should  not  perform  risky  transactions  with  only  speculative  self-
interested  motives.  (Hilger,  H.  A.,  Aktueller  Begriff:  der  Glass-Steagall  Act  und  die 
Bankenregulierung  (Nr.05/10):  Wissenschaftlicher  Dienst  des  Deutschen  Bundestages, 
10.10.2012).  
8 R e p o r t  o f  t h e  L i i k a n e n  G r o u p ,  a n  E U  E x p e r t  G r o u p  f or  the  regulation  of  major  credit 
institutions:  [http://ec.europa.eu/internel_market/bank/docs/high-
level_expert_group/report_de.pdf]; the report is named after Erkki Liikanen, the chairman of 
this group, who is the Governor of the Central Bank of Finland and therefore a member of the 
European Central Bank Governing Council. 
9 The term „major bank“ in the Liikanen Report is related to the proportion of trading on own 
account in the total assets of the bank (starting from  15%)  and/or  the  absolute  amount  of 
trading on own account (starting from 100 billion euros). The Liikanen Report recommends to 
restrict the  obligation  to  keep the two  business  areas apart  and to  apply  it  only  to  „major 
banks“. Such a restriction cannot be explained by any practical reasons and therefore we may 
assume the interests of the banking lobby here.  
10 This does not include transactions ordered by business clients in financial markets, such as 
risk guarantees for actual, serious valid contracts to insure against fluctuations of prices of raw 
materials and currency exchange rates. The same applies to credit default swaps and certainly 
also to issuing of corporate shares. (Cf here also: Eesti majanduspoliitilised väitlused, 2-2012, 
footnote 17).  
11 That would make it possible to control (as expected) the trading on own account.   26
refinancing costs. The issue of whether introduction of a system that would keep 
commercial  and  investment  banks  apart  would  set  at  risk  the  reputation  of 
participating  EU  countries  as  host  countries  for  financial  institutions  would  still 
concern only separately performed investment transactions. For client-based bank 
transactions, closeness to real economy is a practical necessity.  
 
Keeping  traditional  business  transactions  separate  from  risky  and  complex 
investment  transactions  is  the  most  important  measure  for  controlling  financial 
markets. This, however, assumes that not only „major banks“ but all banks would be 
obliged to keep these two fundamentally different areas separate. A bank which is 
too small from the aspects of business economy to implement such a separation, 
should avoid performing such risky transactions.  
 
If it is guaranteed that subsidiaries of a group have no access to the main bank when 
trading on their own account and that credit institutions oriented only to clients do 
not engage in investment banking activities and are not allowed to refinance them, 
the issue of whether trading on own account should be generally restricted or even 
prohibited is of secondary importance. Purely speculative  instruments  (forwards) 
should be prohibited in any case. Such transactions with derivates are risky for the 
system and partly immoral and have no relation to real economy. Such transactions 
are based on expectations that prices of commodities, such as agricultural products 
or raw materials, will change in the future, and are objects of speculation. In the 
past, such interventions of banks in the functioning of the economy have lead to 
price excesses. These in their turn set at risk the regular supply of the population 
with  food  products  –  particularly  in  the  poorest  regions  of  the  world  –  and 
manufacturing sectors with intermediate products.  
 
The remaining bank transactions that should be kept separate consist in speculative 
trading  on  own  account  for  the  purpose  of  quoting  currency  exchange  rates, 
securities and other rights. These too are performed on own account and at own risk 
and are therefore not client-based. Such trading is performed – similar to the current 
forward transactions – not on stock exchanges but outside controlled markets, in the 
form of over-the-counter contracts. As such transactions are mostly not sufficiently 
secured with equity, unsuccessful speculations may easily lead to the insolvency of 
the performer of the transaction and start a chain reaction due to interdependencies 
in  national  economy.  Therefore  it  is  so  important  to  allow  performance  of  the 
transactions described above in principle only with the permission of a higher level 
authority
12 and under the control of such an authority.  
 
According to the requirements of the European Parliament, banks should be obliged 
– and this concerns internationally operating major banks of the Western world – to 
present  in  their  balance  sheet  the  profits  earned  from  operations  in  different 
                                                                  
12 Analogously with the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S.A., the European Market I nfrastructure 
Regulation (EMIR) provides that OTC derivatives will have to be secured, in principle, and 
agreed  on  between  central  counterparties  (CCP)  and  registered  in  a  central  register  of 
transactions.    27
countries  and  the  taxes  paid  on  these  profits.  Such d i s c l o s u r e  w o u l d  m a k e  i t  
considerably more difficult to take their business to tax oases and would help to 
fight with aggressive tax manipulations.  
 
The principle that economic subjects who perform risky transactions when seeking 
high profits and bonuses should bear also full responsibility for them should be 
established  and  remain  in  effect  in  market  economy. R i s k ,  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a n d  
consequently also liability are inseparable concepts. The situation where banks may 
be sure of state aid, i.e. eventually assistance of taxpayers, due to their importance 
for the system should not exist. This will make it tempting to take excessive risks 
(moral hazard), which makes the whole system more vulnerable and more prone to 
crises. Losses should not be socialised while keeping the privatisation of profits and 
outrageously high salaries and bonuses of managers. The losses that cannot be set 
off in some other way have to be born by the responsible management and owners 
of  banks.  This  specifically  means  the  following:  in t h e  c a s e  o f  i n s o l v e n c y ,  
responsible  managers  should  repay  to  the  company  at l e a s t  p a r t l y  t h e i r  s a l a r i e s  
earned during a certain period (e.g. from the last five to ten years) to cover the loss, 
and shareholders should give up their shares
13 in exchange for claims or creditors 
(debt-equity-swaps, bail-in). 
 
The approach to the payment of bonuses which were originally paid for particularly 
good achievements should be different. As success or failure becomes evident only 
several years later, bonuses should not be paid out in cash immediately. Bonuses 
would be first paid out in the form of bonds – to a certain extent, as surety bonds. 
These bonds can be cashed after a term of five to ten years, provided that the bank 
has  not  become  insolvent  during  that  period
14.  The  collective  liability  of  bonus 
recipients could have also an additional effect – each of them would be more aware 
of possible problems and would take into account the risks related to their activities 
and would also observe more critically the activities of their colleagues. Such a rule 
would consequently have a disciplinary effect.  
 
If the debts of a bank exceed its equity in some cases – including debt-equity-swaps 
– also creditors could be involved in bearing losses through reducing or giving up 
their claims. That would considerably increase the refinancing costs of the banks 
which are in difficulties anyway already. Therefore in such cases it would be more 
right to choose the solution of converting the claims of  creditors into obligatory 
bonds,  i.e.  to  apply  the  method  of  surety  bonds  with  potential  corresponding 
increasing of the equity.  
 
In September 2012, Heads of State or Government of the euro area decided to use 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), financed by the countries of  the eur o 
                                                                  
13 And also bank managers their shares and stock options  received  earlier  as  performance 
bonuses. 
14 Also disbursement of bonuses could be contingent on that – following the example of Union 
de Banques Suisses (UBS) – to avoid the decrease of equity quota below a certain limit (in the 
above-mentioned case below 7%).    28
area, directly for making aid payments to banks in trouble. This clearly violates the 
principle that no public funds but only private funds should be used for rescuing 
business units. In order to prevent the misuse of tax funds for rescuing banks in 
future crisis situations, a restructuring fund owned by banks should be created on the 
basis  of  European  law
15 f o r  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  o n l y  i f  all 
mandatory conditions have been fulfilled. The vicious circle which has appeared due 
to the close interconnections of the financial sector with national debt has to be 
broken  once  and  for  all.  In  that  sense,  the  above-mentioned  fund  can  only  be 
financed with funds from the banking sector itself. Also a liquidation fund can be 
integrated  in  that  rescue  fund  to  cover  unsecured  losses  of  insolvent  banks,  if 
necessary. Administration should be assigned to an European financial stabilisation 
institution independent of the European Central Bank.  
 
In order to guarantee alleviation of potential losses already in advance, existence of 
sufficient equity should be ensured. This was the subject of the Basel Commission 
already in 1988. However, in the decisions adopted (Basel I), varying risks of certain 
assets  and  liquidity  aspects  were  insufficiently  taken  into  account  for  the 
determination the capital requirements. Subsequent decision packages of Basel II 
and  Basel  III  will  have  to  fill  these  gaps.  Basel  II  provides  creation  of  equity 
backings of different sizes for risky assets (such as credits issued according to the 
solvency/rating of the debtor)
16. Basel III goes even further, introducing two more 
precautionary  indicators  of  liquidity:  the  liquidity  coverage  ratio  (LCR)  and  net 
stable  funding  ratio  (NSFR).  According  to  both  indicators,  banks  have  to  retain 
sufficiently  high  liquidity  in  addition  to  the  mandatory  equity.  This  specifically 
means that the liquidity level of banks (high-liquidity assets and assured refinancing 
opportunities) should be higher than necessary (for expected liquidity outflows and 
the necessary stable refinancing).  
 
The  basic  idea  of  these  preconditions  is  correct.  But  looking  at  their  possible 
consequences  the  matter  should  be  considered  more  thoroughly.  The  indicators 
described  will  probably  induce  banks  to  issue  short-term  loans  or  to  use  liquid 
resources for buying reliable securities instead of issuing long-term loans. It would 
lead to a situation where businesses – particularly during periods of crisis – would 
have more difficulties in financing their long-term loans. The new balance sheet 
rules can procyclically strengthen this effect even more. Because if banks present 
their assets in the balance sheet according to actual market values, it increases the 
equity  at  the  times  of  active  market  but  reduces  it d u r i n g  c r i s i s .  I t  i s  v e r y  
questionable  whether  and  when  the  European  Systemic R i s k  B o a r d  ( E S R B )  
                                                                  
15 According to the model of the German Bank Restructuring Act of 2010. Bearing in mind the 
currently still extraordinarily varying financial difficulties in different countries of the euro 
area, establishment of national restructuring funds could be considered instead of a joint fund 
for banks of the Member States during the transition period until overcoming the European 
financial crisis. They could later be combined into a common European fund.  
16 D i s c u s s i o n s  o f  t h e  n e w  E U  C a p i t a l  R e q u i r e m e n t s  D i r ective  (CRD  IV)  and  the  related 
Regulation (CRR) have still not achieved satisfactory results.    29
established at the European Central Bank can solve these interconnected problems. 
Nothing has happened until now in that respect.  
 
According to the current experience, high frequency trading
17 in security markets 
may have an extremely destabilising effect. Up-to-date data processing technology 
makes it possible for brokers to execute orders microseconds before other orders 
with the help of computer-generated algorithms, to combine transactions in the same 
direction with immediately following transactions in the opposite direction and earn 
profits that way
18. In many cases the aim of such actors is just to test the reaction of 
the security market. Such mixed signals may, however, lead to excessive variations 
of  rates  and  destroy  financial  values  to  the  extent o f  m a n y  b i l l i o n s
19 w i t h o u t  
reflecting actual developments in real economy.  
 
In order to prevent such perverse trading practices in the future, a minimum resting 
time  of  stock  exchange  orders  has  to  be  established
20,  which  is  also  a 
recommendation of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European 
Parliament. The resting times should be strictly monitored with computer software. 
Intermediate solutions have to be found until such regulation mandatory for all is 
reached in the European Union. Brokers and investment funds who want to perform 
computer-generated automatic transactions in financial markets should first of all 
apply for a separate licence to make it possible to monitor strictly their activities
21. 
Considerable  fines  should  be  imposed  on  misleading  orders  placed  without  the 
intention of performing actual transactions. 
 
The  management  of  trading  institutions  and  stock  exchanges  should  have  the 
additional  obligation  to  stop  trading  immediately  in  the  case  of  extraordinary 
developments of rates and to identify the causes. Besides – the order-to-trade-ratio 
should  be  constantly  monitored  to  detect  violations o f  r u l e s  a n d  s t o p  w r o n g  
developments in time.  
 
The fees paid to board and council members, salaries of top management and also 
bonuses paid in the banking sector have grown to such amounts by now that it is 
difficult to justify them to the general public. Such development sets social cohesion 
                                                                  
17 Cf here: Lattemann, CH. (et al), High Frequency Trading – Costs and Benefits in Securities 
Trading and its Necessity of Regulations, in: Business & Information Systems Engineering, 
Vol. 4, 2012, Issue 2, pp. 93 – 108. 
18 Which may be very small in single cases but may add up to large total amounts.  
19 For instance, in U.S. stock markets on 6 May 2010 when the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
Index lost more than 9% within minutes, which was equivalent to a loss of 1000 points (Flash 
Crash).  It  was  caused  by  a  wrong  order  which  led  to n u m e r o u s  o r d e r s  s e n t  t o  t h e  s t o c k  
exchange from IT systems of high frequency brokers in milliseconds.  
20 The Eco nomic and Monetary  A f fairs Committee of the E ur o pe an  P ar l i am e nt  pr e f e r s the  
minimum resting time of 0.5 seconds for orders. This is surely too short.  
21 Including the algorithms they are using. The respective draft act (Act for the Prevention of 
Risks and the Abuse of High Frequency Trading – High-Frequency Trading Act) has been 
discussed  in  Germany  since  30  July  2012.  The  intention  is  to  subject  also  transactions 
performed outside public trading in stock markets (dark pool of liquidity) to this future Act.    30
at risk. In the formulation of a transparent remuneration system the bonuses have to 
be related to basic salary rates. If only bonuses were regulated, basic salaries could 
still be changed in the future to achieve the desired result. Therefore fixed basic 
salary rates should serve as a basis for the socio-politically justified and transparent 
regulation.  
 
The easiest solution would be to establish fixed maximum salary rates in financial 
law
22 that can be recorded as legitimate personnel expenses. The same would then 
apply to also uno actu bonuses if they are limited to the basic salary rate. That way 
subventioning of the excessive salaries of bankers by taxpayers could be stopped as 
the taxable profits of banks and therefore also tax revenues of the state are low. Such 
regulations would not violate the principle of free m a r ke t  e c onom y .  A ls o i n t he  
future, the committee with decision-making power in every company could consider 
whether they should exceed the establish limits if they need to hire highly qualified 
people to executive posts in the conditions of international competition. For banks 
such rules would mean that salaries which exceed maximum rates would have to be 
paid from after-tax profits.  
 
The tax law approach described cannot apply only to the banking sector, considering 
the  basic  rights.  It  has  to  cover  all  business  enterprises.  This,  however,  would 
assume harmonisation of the European Union tax legislation, i.e., in essence, the 
creation of a fiscal union. But there is still a long way to go before EU achieves that 
and each Member State gives up its own national tax system for the benefit of a 
common European tax authority. Until then we will have to find an intermediate 
solution for the creation of socially justified and transparent remuneration systems.  
 
Therefore the maximum salary rate should be fixed first, allowing to pay also higher 
salaries in exceptional cases and on the basis of definite socially still justified scales. 
Achievement of outstanding results gives the right to receive bonuses which cannot 
exceed the basic salary rate. Such a varying form of payment shall not be disbursed 
immediately, considering precautions for the liability for risks, but should be issued 
in the form of surety bonds. It would only be fair to set the interest rate of such 
securities  two  to  three  percentage  points  higher  than  the  interest  rate  of  similar 
ordinary loans, i.e. higher than that of contingent convertible bonds (CoCo Bonds). 
All payments to board and council members, also to all high-salaried executives 
should be disclosed. Disclosure of salary rates may contribute to achievement of 
moderation. 
 
Fulfilment of the requirements for the regulation of financial markets have to be 
monitored  by  higher-level  authorities.  Financial  markets  can  only  be  disciplined 
with  strong  central  supervision.  If  supervision  is  assigned  to  national  banking 
inspectors, they may be insufficiently strict in inspecting domestic banks.  
 
                                                                  
22 The fact that the rate should be constantly adjusted to economic development, above all the 
development of prices, may cause difficulties.    31
The  Heads  of  State  or  Government  of  the  euro  area  decided  that  the  European 
Central Bank should take this task. It is important above all to keep monetary policy 
and supervision firmly apart both institutionally and on the level of staff to avoid 
any conflicts of interest. This applies above all bearing in mind the stability of the 
price level. It is also important to keep a clear division of tasks between performers 
of supervision on the part of the European Central Bank and on the part of each 
Member  State  and  to  continue  close  cooperation  nevertheless.  Cooperation  is 
important also because national central banks have direct contacts with banks and 
are therefore most familiar with domestic systems and also specific features of local 
business  models  and  financial  transactions.  This  knowledge  makes  it  easier  to 
compare  the  strategies  implemented.  The  European  banking  supervision  should, 
however,  have  the  right  to  intervene  in  cooperation w i t h  n a t i o n a l  s u p e r v i s o r y  
authorities in the activities of insolvent banks of countries which are in crisis, in 
order to encourage their sustainable recapitalisation.  
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